ch06_IntegritySecurity task in gdbms.pdf

©Silberschatz, Korth and Sudarshan
6.1
Database System Concepts
Chapter 6: Integrity and Security
● Domain Constraints
● Referential Integrity
● Assertions
● Triggers
● Security
● Authorization
● Authorization in SQL

6.2
Domain Constraints
● Integrity constraints guard against accidental damage to the database, by
ensuring that authorized changes to the database do not result in a loss of
data consistency.
● Domain constraints are the most elementary form of integrity constraint.
● They test values inserted in the database, and test queries to ensure that
the comparisons make sense.
● New domains can be created from existing data types
● E.g. create domain Dollars numeric(12, 2)
create domain Pounds numeric(12,2)
● We cannot assign or compare a value of type Dollars to a value of type
Pounds.
● However, we can convert type as below
(cast r.A as Pounds)
(Should also multiply by the dollar-to-pound conversion-rate)

6.3
Domain Constraints (Cont.)
● The check clause in SQL-92 permits domains to be restricted:
● Use check clause to ensure that an hourly-wage domain allows only values
greater than a specified value.
create domain hourly-wage numeric(5,2)
constraint value-test check(value > = 4.00)
● The domain has a constraint that ensures that the hourly-wage is greater
than 4.00
● The clause constraint value-test is optional; useful to indicate which
constraint an update violated.
● Can have complex conditions in domain check
● create domain AccountType char(10)
constraint account-type-test
check (value in (‘Checking’, ‘Saving’))
● check (branch-name in (select branch-name from branch))

6.4
Referential Integrity
● Ensures that a value that appears in one relation for a given set of
attributes also appears for a certain set of attributes in another relation.
● Example: If “Perryridge” is a branch name appearing in one of the tuples in
the account relation, then there exists a tuple in the branch relation for branch
“Perryridge”.
● Formal Definition
● Let r1
(R1
) and r2
(R2
) be relations with primary keys K1
and K2
respectively.
● The subset α of R2
is a foreign key referencing K1
in relation r1
, if for every
t
2
in r
2
there must be a tuple t
1
in r
1
such that t
1
[K
1
] = t
2
[α].
● Referential integrity constraint also called subset dependency since its can be
written as
∏
α
(r
2
) ⊆ ∏
K1
(r
1
)

6.5
Referential Integrity in the E-R Model
● Consider relationship set R between entity sets E1
and E2
. The
relational schema for R includes the primary keys K1
of E1
and K2
of
E2
.
Then K1
and K2
form foreign keys on the relational schemas for E1
and
E2
respectively.
● Weak entity sets are also a source of referential integrity constraints.
● For the relation schema for a weak entity set must include the primary key
attributes of the entity set on which it depends
R
E1 E2

6.6
Checking Referential Integrity on Database
Modification
● The following tests must be made in order to preserve the following
referential integrity constraint:
∏α
(r2
) ⊆ ∏K
(r1
)
● Insert. If a tuple t2
is inserted into r2
, the system must ensure that
there is a tuple t1
in r1
such that t1
[K] = t2
[α]. That is
t2
[α] ∈ ∏K
(r1
)
● Delete. If a tuple, t1
is deleted from r1
, the system must compute the
set of tuples in r2
that reference t1
:
σα = t1[K]
(r2
)
If this set is not empty
● either the delete command is rejected as an error, or
● the tuples that reference t1
must themselves be deleted
(cascading deletions are possible).

6.7
Database Modification (Cont.)
● Update. There are two cases:
● If a tuple t2
is updated in relation r2
and the update modifies values for foreign
key α, then a test similar to the insert case is made:
● Let t2
’ denote the new value of tuple t2
. The system must ensure that
t2
’[α] ∈ ∏K
(r1
)
● If a tuple t1
is updated in r1
, and the update modifies values for the primary key
(K), then a test similar to the delete case is made:
1. The system must compute
σα = t1[K]
(r2
)
using the old value of t1
(the value before the update is applied).
2. If this set is not empty
1. the update may be rejected as an error, or
2. the update may be cascaded to the tuples in the set, or
3. the tuples in the set may be deleted.

6.8
Referential Integrity in SQL
● Primary and candidate keys and foreign keys can be specified as part of the
SQL create table statement:
● The primary key clause lists attributes that comprise the primary key.
● The unique key clause lists attributes that comprise a candidate key.
● The foreign key clause lists the attributes that comprise the foreign key and the name
of the relation referenced by the foreign key.
● By default, a foreign key references the primary key attributes of the referenced
table
foreign key (account-number) references account
● Short form for specifying a single column as foreign key
account-number char (10) references account
● Reference columns in the referenced table can be explicitly specified
● but must be declared as primary/candidate keys
foreign key (account-number) references account(account-number)

6.9
Referential Integrity in SQL – Example
create table customer
(customer-name char(20),
customer-street char(30),
customer-city char(30),
primary key (customer-name))
create table branch
(branch-name char(15),
branch-city char(30),
assets integer,
primary key (branch-name))

6.10
Referential Integrity in SQL – Example (Cont.)
create table account
(account-number char(10),
branch-name char(15),
balance integer,
primary key (account-number),
foreign key (branch-name) references branch)
create table depositor
(customer-name char(20),
account-number char(10),
primary key (customer-name, account-number),
foreign key (account-number) references account,
foreign key (customer-name) references customer)

6.11
Cascading Actions in SQL
create table account
. . .
foreign key(branch-name) references branch
on delete cascade
on update cascade
. . . )
● Due to the on delete cascade clauses, if a delete of a tuple in branch
results in referential-integrity constraint violation, the delete “cascades”
to the account relation, deleting the tuple that refers to the branch that
was deleted.
● Cascading updates are similar.

6.12
Cascading Actions in SQL (Cont.)
● If there is a chain of foreign-key dependencies across multiple relations,
with on delete cascade specified for each dependency, a deletion or
update at one end of the chain can propagate across the entire chain.
● If a cascading update to delete causes a constraint violation that cannot be
handled by a further cascading operation, the system aborts the
transaction.
● As a result, all the changes caused by the transaction and its cascading
actions are undone.
● Referential integrity is only checked at the end of a transaction
● Intermediate steps are allowed to violate referential integrity provided later
steps remove the violation
● Otherwise it would be impossible to create some database states, e.g. insert
two tuples whose foreign keys point to each other
● E.g. spouse attribute of relation
marriedperson(name, address, spouse)

6.13
Referential Integrity in SQL (Cont.)
● Alternative to cascading:
● on delete set null
● on delete set default
● Null values in foreign key attributes complicate SQL referential
integrity semantics, and are best prevented using not null
● if any attribute of a foreign key is null, the tuple is defined to satisfy the
foreign key constraint!

6.14
Assertions
● An assertion is a predicate expressing a condition that we wish the
database always to satisfy.
● An assertion in SQL takes the form
create assertion <assertion-name> check <predicate>
● When an assertion is made, the system tests it for validity, and tests it
again on every update that may violate the assertion
● This testing may introduce a significant amount of overhead; hence
assertions should be used with great care.
● Asserting
for all X, P(X)
is achieved in a round-about fashion using
not exists X such that not P(X)

6.15
Assertion Example
● The sum of all loan amounts for each branch must be less than the sum
of all account balances at the branch.
create assertion sum-constraint check
(not exists (select * from branch
where (select sum(amount) from loan
where loan.branch-name =
branch.branch-name)
>= (select sum(amount) from account
where loan.branch-name =
branch.branch-name)))

6.16
Assertion Example
● Every loan has at least one borrower who maintains an account with a
minimum balance or $1000.00
create assertion balance-constraint check
(not exists (
select * from loan
where not exists (
select *
from borrower, depositor, account
where loan.loan-number = borrower.loan-number
and borrower.customer-name = depositor.customer-name
and depositor.account-number = account.account-number
and account.balance >= 1000)))

6.17
Triggers
● A trigger is a statement that is executed automatically by the system as
a side effect of a modification to the database.
● To design a trigger mechanism, we must:
● Specify the conditions under which the trigger is to be executed.
● Specify the actions to be taken when the trigger executes.
● Triggers introduced to SQL standard in SQL:1999, but supported even
earlier using non-standard syntax by most databases.

6.18
Trigger Example
● Suppose that instead of allowing negative account balances, the bank
deals with overdrafts by
● setting the account balance to zero
● creating a loan in the amount of the overdraft
● giving this loan a loan number identical to the account number of the
overdrawn account
● The condition for executing the trigger is an update to the account
relation that results in a negative balance value.

6.19
Trigger Example in SQL:1999
create trigger overdraft-trigger after update on account
referencing new row as nrow
for each row
when nrow.balance < 0
begin atomic
insert into borrower
(select customer-name, account-number
from depositor
where nrow.account-number =
depositor.account-number);
insert into loan values
(n.row.account-number, nrow.branch-name,
– nrow.balance);
update account set balance = 0
where account.account-number = nrow.account-number
end

6.20
Triggering Events and Actions in SQL
● Triggering event can be insert, delete or update
● Triggers on update can be restricted to specific attributes
● E.g. create trigger overdraft-trigger after update of balance on account
● Values of attributes before and after an update can be referenced
● referencing old row as : for deletes and updates
● referencing new row as : for inserts and updates
● Triggers can be activated before an event, which can serve as extra
constraints. E.g. convert blanks to null.
create trigger setnull-trigger before update on r
referencing new row as nrow
for each row
when nrow.phone-number = ‘ ‘
set nrow.phone-number = null

6.21
Statement Level Triggers
● Instead of executing a separate action for each affected row, a single
action can be executed for all rows affected by a transaction
● Use for each statement instead of for each row
● Use referencing old table or referencing new table to refer to
temporary tables (called transition tables) containing the affected rows
● Can be more efficient when dealing with SQL statements that update a
large number of rows

6.22
External World Actions
● We sometimes require external world actions to be triggered on a database
update
● E.g. re-ordering an item whose quantity in a warehouse has become small, or
turning on an alarm light,
● Triggers cannot be used to directly implement external-world actions,
BUT
● Triggers can be used to record actions-to-be-taken in a separate table
● Have an external process that repeatedly scans the table, carries out
external-world actions and deletes action from table
● E.g. Suppose a warehouse has the following tables
● inventory(item, level): How much of each item is in the warehouse
● minlevel(item, level) : What is the minimum desired level of each item
● reorder(item, amount): What quantity should we re-order at a time
● orders(item, amount) : Orders to be placed (read by external process)

6.23
External World Actions (Cont.)
create trigger reorder-trigger after update of amount on inventory
referencing old row as orow, new row as nrow
for each row
when nrow.level < = (select level
from minlevel
where minlevel.item = orow.item)
and orow.level > (select level
from minlevel
where minlevel.item = orow.item)
begin
insert into orders
(select item, amount
from reorder
where reorder.item = orow.item)
end

6.24
Triggers in MS-SQLServer Syntax
create trigger overdraft-trigger on account
for update
as
if inserted.balance < 0
begin
insert into borrower
(select customer-name,account-number
from depositor, inserted
where inserted.account-number =
depositor.account-number)
insert into loan values
(inserted.account-number, inserted.branch-name,
– inserted.balance)
update account set balance = 0
from account, inserted
where account.account-number = inserted.account-number
end

6.25
When Not To Use Triggers
● Triggers were used earlier for tasks such as
● maintaining summary data (e.g. total salary of each department)
● Replicating databases by recording changes to special relations (called
change or delta relations) and having a separate process that applies the
changes over to a replica
● There are better ways of doing these now:
● Databases today provide built in materialized view facilities to maintain
summary data
● Databases provide built-in support for replication
● Encapsulation facilities can be used instead of triggers in many cases
● Define methods to update fields
● Carry out actions as part of the update methods instead of
through a trigger

6.26
Security
● Security - protection from malicious attempts to steal or modify data.
● Database system level
● Authentication and authorization mechanisms to allow specific users access
only to required data
● We concentrate on authorization in the rest of this chapter
● Operating system level
● Operating system super-users can do anything they want to the database!
Good operating system level security is required.
● Network level: must use encryption to prevent
● Eavesdropping (unauthorized reading of messages)
● Masquerading (pretending to be an authorized user or sending messages
supposedly from authorized users)

6.27
Security (Cont.)
● Physical level
● Physical access to computers allows destruction of data by intruders;
traditional lock-and-key security is needed
● Computers must also be protected from floods, fire, etc.
– More in Chapter 17 (Recovery)
● Human level
● Users must be screened to ensure that an authorized users do not give
access to intruders
● Users should be trained on password selection and secrecy

6.28
Authorization
Forms of authorization on parts of the database:
● Read authorization - allows reading, but not modification of data.
● Insert authorization - allows insertion of new data, but not modification
of existing data.
● Update authorization - allows modification, but not deletion of data.
● Delete authorization - allows deletion of data

6.29
Authorization (Cont.)
Forms of authorization to modify the database schema:
● Index authorization - allows creation and deletion of indices.
● Resources authorization - allows creation of new relations.
● Alteration authorization - allows addition or deletion of attributes in a
relation.
● Drop authorization - allows deletion of relations.

6.30
Authorization and Views
● Users can be given authorization on views, without being given any
authorization on the relations used in the view definition
● Ability of views to hide data serves both to simplify usage of the
system and to enhance security by allowing users access only to data
they need for their job
● A combination or relational-level security and view-level security can
be used to limit a user’s access to precisely the data that user needs.

6.31
View Example
● Suppose a bank clerk needs to know the names of the customers of
each branch, but is not authorized to see specific loan information.
● Approach: Deny direct access to the loan relation, but grant access to the
view cust-loan, which consists only of the names of customers and the
branches at which they have a loan.
● The cust-loan view is defined in SQL as follows:
create view cust-loan as
select branchname, customer-name
from borrower, loan
where borrower.loan-number = loan.loan-number

6.32
View Example (Cont.)
● The clerk is authorized to see the result of the query:
select *
from cust-loan
● When the query processor translates the result into a query on the
actual relations in the database, we obtain a query on borrower and
loan.
● Authorization must be checked on the clerk’s query before query
processing replaces a view by the definition of the view.

6.33
Authorization on Views
● Creation of view does not require resources authorization since no real
relation is being created
● The creator of a view gets only those privileges that provide no
additional authorization beyond that he already had.
● E.g. if creator of view cust-loan had only read authorization on
borrower and loan, he gets only read authorization on cust-loan

6.34
Granting of Privileges
● The passage of authorization from one user to another may be
represented by an authorization graph.
● The nodes of this graph are the users.
● The root of the graph is the database administrator.
● Consider graph for update authorization on loan.
● An edge Ui
→Uj
indicates that user Ui
has granted update authorization
on loan to Uj.
U1 U4
U2 U5
U3
DBA

6.35
Authorization Grant Graph
● Requirement: All edges in an authorization graph must be part of some
path originating with the database administrator
● If DBA revokes grant from U1
:
● Grant must be revoked from U4
since U1
no longer has authorization
● Grant must not be revoked from U5
since U5
has another authorization path
from DBA through U2
● Must prevent cycles of grants with no path from the root:
● DBA grants authorization to U7
● U7 grants authorization to U8
● U8 grants authorization to U7
● DBA revokes authorization from U7
● Must revoke grant U7
to U8
and from U8
to U7
since there is no path
from DBA to U7
or to U8
anymore.

6.36
Security Specification in SQL
● The grant statement is used to confer authorization
grant <privilege list>
on <relation name or view name> to <user list>
● <user list> is:
● a user-id
● public, which allows all valid users the privilege granted
● A role (more on this later)
● Granting a privilege on a view does not imply granting any privileges
on the underlying relations.
● The grantor of the privilege must already hold the privilege on the
specified item (or be the database administrator).

6.37
Privileges in SQL
● select: allows read access to relation,or the ability to query using the view
● Example: grant users U1
, U2
, and U3
select authorization on the branch relation:
grant select on branch to U1
, U2
, U3
● insert: the ability to insert tuples
● update: the ability to update using the SQL update statement
● delete: the ability to delete tuples.
● references: ability to declare foreign keys when creating relations.
● usage: In SQL-92; authorizes a user to use a specified domain
● all privileges: used as a short form for all the allowable privileges

6.38
Privilege To Grant Privileges
● with grant option: allows a user who is granted a privilege to pass the
privilege on to other users.
● Example:
grant select on branch to U1
with grant option
gives U1
the select privileges on branch and allows U1
to grant this
privilege to others

6.39
Roles
● Roles permit common privileges for a class of users can be specified just
once by creating a corresponding “role”
● Privileges can be granted to or revoked from roles, just like user
● Roles can be assigned to users, and even to other roles
● SQL:1999 supports roles
create role teller
create role manager
grant select on branch to teller
grant update (balance) on account to teller
grant all privileges on account to manager
grant teller to manager
grant teller to alice, bob
grant manager to avi

6.40
Revoking Authorization in SQL
● The revoke statement is used to revoke authorization.
revoke<privilege list>
on <relation name or view name> from <user list> [restrict|cascade]
● Example:
revoke select on branch from U1
, U2
, U3
cascade
● Revocation of a privilege from a user may cause other users also to lose
that privilege; referred to as cascading of the revoke.
● We can prevent cascading by specifying restrict:
revoke select on branch from U1
, U2
, U3
restrict
With restrict, the revoke command fails if cascading revokes are
required.

6.41
Revoking Authorization in SQL (Cont.)
● <privilege-list> may be all to revoke all privileges the revokee may
hold.
● If <revokee-list> includes public all users lose the privilege except
those granted it explicitly.
● If the same privilege was granted twice to the same user by different
grantees, the user may retain the privilege after the revocation.
● All privileges that depend on the privilege being revoked are also
revoked.

6.42
Limitations of SQL Authorization
● SQL does not support authorization at a tuple level
● E.g. we cannot restrict students to see only (the tuples storing) their own grades
● With the growth in Web access to databases, database accesses come primarily
from application servers.
● End users don't have database user ids, they are all mapped to the same database
user id
● All end-users of an application (such as a web application) may be mapped to a
single database user
● The task of authorization in above cases falls on the application program, with
no support from SQL
● Benefit: fine grained authorizations, such as to individual tuples, can be implemented
by the application.
● Drawback: Authorization must be done in application code, and may be dispersed
all over an application
● Checking for absence of authorization loopholes becomes very difficult since it
requires reading large amounts of application code

6.43
Audit Trails
● An audit trail is a log of all changes (inserts/deletes/updates) to the
database along with information such as which user performed the
change, and when the change was performed.
● Used to track erroneous/fraudulent updates.
● Can be implemented using triggers, but many database systems provide
direct support.

6.44
Encryption
● Data may be encrypted when database authorization provisions do not
offer sufficient protection.
● Properties of good encryption technique:
● Relatively simple for authorized users to encrypt and decrypt data.
● Encryption scheme depends not on the secrecy of the algorithm but on the
secrecy of a parameter of the algorithm called the encryption key.
● Extremely difficult for an intruder to determine the encryption key.

6.45
Encryption (Cont.)
● Data Encryption Standard (DES) substitutes characters and rearranges their
order on the basis of an encryption key which is provided to authorized users
via a secure mechanism. Scheme is no more secure than the key transmission
mechanism since the key has to be shared.
● Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a new standard replacing DES, and is
based on the Rijndael algorithm, but is also dependent on shared secret keys
● Public-key encryption is based on each user having two keys:
● public key – publicly published key used to encrypt data, but cannot be used to
decrypt data
● private key -- key known only to individual user, and used to decrypt data.
Need not be transmitted to the site doing encryption.
Encryption scheme is such that it is impossible or extremely hard to decrypt
data given only the public key.
● The RSA public-key encryption scheme is based on the hardness of factoring a
very large number (100's of digits) into its prime components.

6.46
Authentication
● Password based authentication is widely used, but is susceptible to
sniffing on a network
● Challenge-response systems avoid transmission of passwords
● DB sends a (randomly generated) challenge string to user
● User encrypts string and returns result.
● DB verifies identity by decrypting result
● Can use public-key encryption system by DB sending a message encrypted
using user’s public key, and user decrypting and sending the message back
● Digital signatures are used to verify authenticity of data
● E.g. use private key (in reverse) to encrypt data, and anyone can verify
authenticity by using public key (in reverse) to decrypt data. Only holder of
private key could have created the encrypted data.
● Digital signatures also help ensure nonrepudiation: sender
cannot later claim to have not created the data

6.47
Digital Certificates
● Digital certificates are used to verify authenticity of public keys.
● Problem: when you communicate with a web site, how do you know if you
are talking with the genuine web site or an imposter?
● Solution: use the public key of the web site
● Problem: how to verify if the public key itself is genuine?
● Solution:
● Every client (e.g. browser) has public keys of a few root-level certification
authorities
● A site can get its name/URL and public key signed by a certification authority:
signed document is called a certificate
● Client can use public key of certification authority to verify certificate
● Multiple levels of certification authorities can exist. Each certification authority
● presents its own public-key certificate signed by a
higher level authority, and
● Uses its private key to sign the certificate of other web sites/authorities

6.49
Statistical Databases
● Problem: how to ensure privacy of individuals while allowing use of
data for statistical purposes (e.g., finding median income, average bank
balance etc.)
● Solutions:
● System rejects any query that involves fewer than some predetermined
number of individuals.
* Still possible to use results of multiple overlapping queries to
deduce data about an individual
● Data pollution -- random falsification of data provided in response to a
query.
● Random modification of the query itself.
● There is a tradeoff between accuracy and security.

6.50
An n-ary Relationship Set

6.51
Authorization-Grant Graph

6.52
Attempt to Defeat Authorization Revocation

6.53
Authorization Graph

6.54
Physical Level Security
● Protection of equipment from floods, power failure, etc.
● Protection of disks from theft, erasure, physical damage, etc.
● Protection of network and terminal cables from wiretaps non-invasive
electronic eavesdropping, physical damage, etc.
Solutions:
● Replicated hardware:
● mirrored disks, dual busses, etc.
● multiple access paths between every pair of devises
● Physical security: locks,police, etc.
● Software techniques to detect physical security breaches.

6.55
Human Level Security
● Protection from stolen passwords, sabotage, etc.
● Primarily a management problem:
● Frequent change of passwords
● Use of “non-guessable” passwords
● Log all invalid access attempts
● Data audits
● Careful hiring practices

6.56
Operating System Level Security
● Protection from invalid logins
● File-level access protection (often not very helpful for database
security)
● Protection from improper use of “superuser” authority.
● Protection from improper use of privileged machine intructions.

6.57
Network-Level Security
● Each site must ensure that it communicate with trusted sites (not intruders).
● Links must be protected from theft or modification of messages
● Mechanisms:
● Identification protocol (password-based),
● Cryptography.

6.58
Database-Level Security
● Assume security at network, operating system, human, and physical
levels.
● Database specific issues:
● each user may have authority to read only part of the data and to write only
part of the data.
● User authority may correspond to entire files or relations, but it may also
correspond only to parts of files or relations.
● Local autonomy suggests site-level authorization control in a
distributed database.
● Global control suggests centralized control.

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