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Data security
in the age of
GDPR:

Most common data
security problems
Kalle Varisvirta

CTO
Exove
● Data security problems that
have resulted in fines (or are
threatened to)
● Why it happens?
● How to avoid?
● How to detect?
● How to fix?
● How to audit
● How can we help
In this
presentation
Accidental disclosure of data
Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problems
What is it?
● URLs accessible without any authentication
● Typically binary files, such as PDFs, that are stored on a
authentication protected system, but accessible without
any authentication
● API endpoints that are left open without authentication
● Cloud storage with no access control configured
Why?
● For binary files:
● Web-facing servers have traditionally two ways of serving data out, via
server-side programming or just serving ready-made files out, such as
images on a web page
● When serving files out, there’s no “intelligent software” in between the
client and the file
● APIs:
● APIs usually have some sort of authentication, but a lot of developers
might trust that the URL isn’t guessed and leave it open for simplicity
● APIs that don’t “write” are usually considered “secure anyway” by
developers
● Internal search engines are open by default
How to avoid?
● When serving out e.g. PDF files with personal data, make sure
they are served out through a software other than just the
web server software
● When building an API, require all API consumers have their
personal credentials for using the API, even when just reading
information from the API
● When using a cloud storage platform, make sure to configure
the access settings to limit access to the files
How to detect?
● Go to a binary file, copy the URL from the browser to another
browser in private mode and see if you can access it
● For APIs, you should just point your browser to the API,
manipulate the URL on the browser address line and see if
you can access personal data
How to fix?
● Pass all security needed binary files through software; it’s
fairly simple to do, basically you just check the existing
session, set proper headers and pass the file through
● For APIs, you should always have some authentication for
your API, even if it’s just for reading
● Add a simple shared secret / API key for every consumer,
or go a more sophisticated route and use proper
authentication
Lacking internal access control
Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problems
What is it?
● An internal user can access too much information in a system
due to no internal access control or lacking internal access
control
Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problems
Why?
● It’s very typical to focus most resources to actual functionality
of a system, with some focus on external security, too
● Internal security is a topic considered low priority in most
system projects
● By default, even the systems with a highly sophisticated
internal access control settings allow administrator users to
access all information
● Some systems require you to allow access to too much
information, due to the access control setting being too
coarse
How to avoid?
● Always start with taking internal security seriously in a system
project
● Always take internal access control settings into use at the
initial adoption of a system
● Always increase rights as they are needed, starting from the
most limited set of rights you can find will get the job done
● It’s a pain, but it might save a lot in GDPR fines
How to detect?
● Try to access information you shouldn’t be able to access
● Ask others to access information they shouldn’t be able to
access
How to fix?
● If there’s no internal access control in a system, in most cases
one can be built
● If you haven’t taken proper access level into use, do it
● If you haven’t limited the access properly, limit it now
● For giving out access rights, you should have a documented
process that gets followed every time
Targeted attacks
Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problems
What is it?
● A targeted attack to steal personal information from a system
● Typically targeting credit card information
● CC information isn’t safe on the form they are filled into, even
when they are only stored on a external PCI DSS certified
card-on-file service provider
● If it’s written into a box, everything surrounding that box
have to be hardened
● CC information should never be stored to a system not
specifically designed (and certified) to do that
Why?
● Some systems are just too darn good to be true;
● Travel websites handle huge amounts of credit card data
● Online commerce also has variety of ways to handle
payment information
● A targeted attack is done by professional criminals
● They may try to find ways to get in for months or years
How to avoid?
● Avoiding targeted attacks is very hard
● Typical routes to attack are people and their personal
computers of mobile equipment
● Limited access to data and production environments should
be considered in a high risk environment
● Automated checks can also be employed to protect against
malicious files
● Only allow version controlled files to be ran
● Only allow files to version control via a peer review
process
How to detect?
● Targeted attacks are made to be hard to detect
● You can use DLP (data leak protection) technology, that will
try to detect credit card information being sent out, but they
have their own problems (encryption, MITM)
● You can check for all changes on a digital service, and just
verify that all files changed were changed purposefully
● You can keep your eyes open for data being sold on Tor
network or some other darknet
How to fix?
● If you have been attacked, implement the best practices to handle an
attack
● Incident response is a four step process
● Communication
● Seizure
● Analysis
● Reporting
● Recovery for business continuity
● Root cause analysis and changes to policies and processes
● You might want to get help to deal with a targeted attack
How to audit
Auditing for GDPR compliant data protection
● Audits for GDPR compliant personal data security and regular
security audits overlap partially, but one doesn’t cover the
other
● Regular security audits are focused on system security and
are based on security principles such as OWASP top 10
● Data security audit can be significantly lighter and more
focused on personal data protection
Auditing for GDPR compliant data protection
● Security architecture
● Code inspection for risk structures
● Internal access control
● Maintenance and development practices
● Isolation
How can we help?
Security audit focusing on
data protection related risks
for your most vulnerable
internet-facing systems
The aim is to find problems
that, if found by the general
public or attackers, may result
in sanctions
Data
security
audit 

for an internet
facing service
● Security architecture review
● Accidental data leak
inspection
● Automated audit
● Expert review
● Internal access control /
isolation inspection
● Security of maintenance
and deployment practices
review
Data
security
audit 

for an internet
facing service
What’s included?
● Complements data protection
audit done by Bird & Bird by
discovering the unknown
● What’s happening under
the hood?
● Is the architecture
secure?
● Are there vulnerabilities
that may cause a data
leak?
● Are the maintenance
practices secure?
Benefits
Thanks!
Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problems
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Data security in the age of GDPR – most common data security problems

  • 1. Data security in the age of GDPR:
 Most common data security problems Kalle Varisvirta
 CTO Exove
  • 2. ● Data security problems that have resulted in fines (or are threatened to) ● Why it happens? ● How to avoid? ● How to detect? ● How to fix? ● How to audit ● How can we help In this presentation
  • 5. What is it? ● URLs accessible without any authentication ● Typically binary files, such as PDFs, that are stored on a authentication protected system, but accessible without any authentication ● API endpoints that are left open without authentication ● Cloud storage with no access control configured
  • 6. Why? ● For binary files: ● Web-facing servers have traditionally two ways of serving data out, via server-side programming or just serving ready-made files out, such as images on a web page ● When serving files out, there’s no “intelligent software” in between the client and the file ● APIs: ● APIs usually have some sort of authentication, but a lot of developers might trust that the URL isn’t guessed and leave it open for simplicity ● APIs that don’t “write” are usually considered “secure anyway” by developers ● Internal search engines are open by default
  • 7. How to avoid? ● When serving out e.g. PDF files with personal data, make sure they are served out through a software other than just the web server software ● When building an API, require all API consumers have their personal credentials for using the API, even when just reading information from the API ● When using a cloud storage platform, make sure to configure the access settings to limit access to the files
  • 8. How to detect? ● Go to a binary file, copy the URL from the browser to another browser in private mode and see if you can access it ● For APIs, you should just point your browser to the API, manipulate the URL on the browser address line and see if you can access personal data
  • 9. How to fix? ● Pass all security needed binary files through software; it’s fairly simple to do, basically you just check the existing session, set proper headers and pass the file through ● For APIs, you should always have some authentication for your API, even if it’s just for reading ● Add a simple shared secret / API key for every consumer, or go a more sophisticated route and use proper authentication
  • 12. What is it? ● An internal user can access too much information in a system due to no internal access control or lacking internal access control
  • 14. Why? ● It’s very typical to focus most resources to actual functionality of a system, with some focus on external security, too ● Internal security is a topic considered low priority in most system projects ● By default, even the systems with a highly sophisticated internal access control settings allow administrator users to access all information ● Some systems require you to allow access to too much information, due to the access control setting being too coarse
  • 15. How to avoid? ● Always start with taking internal security seriously in a system project ● Always take internal access control settings into use at the initial adoption of a system ● Always increase rights as they are needed, starting from the most limited set of rights you can find will get the job done ● It’s a pain, but it might save a lot in GDPR fines
  • 16. How to detect? ● Try to access information you shouldn’t be able to access ● Ask others to access information they shouldn’t be able to access
  • 17. How to fix? ● If there’s no internal access control in a system, in most cases one can be built ● If you haven’t taken proper access level into use, do it ● If you haven’t limited the access properly, limit it now ● For giving out access rights, you should have a documented process that gets followed every time
  • 20. What is it? ● A targeted attack to steal personal information from a system ● Typically targeting credit card information ● CC information isn’t safe on the form they are filled into, even when they are only stored on a external PCI DSS certified card-on-file service provider ● If it’s written into a box, everything surrounding that box have to be hardened ● CC information should never be stored to a system not specifically designed (and certified) to do that
  • 21. Why? ● Some systems are just too darn good to be true; ● Travel websites handle huge amounts of credit card data ● Online commerce also has variety of ways to handle payment information ● A targeted attack is done by professional criminals ● They may try to find ways to get in for months or years
  • 22. How to avoid? ● Avoiding targeted attacks is very hard ● Typical routes to attack are people and their personal computers of mobile equipment ● Limited access to data and production environments should be considered in a high risk environment ● Automated checks can also be employed to protect against malicious files ● Only allow version controlled files to be ran ● Only allow files to version control via a peer review process
  • 23. How to detect? ● Targeted attacks are made to be hard to detect ● You can use DLP (data leak protection) technology, that will try to detect credit card information being sent out, but they have their own problems (encryption, MITM) ● You can check for all changes on a digital service, and just verify that all files changed were changed purposefully ● You can keep your eyes open for data being sold on Tor network or some other darknet
  • 24. How to fix? ● If you have been attacked, implement the best practices to handle an attack ● Incident response is a four step process ● Communication ● Seizure ● Analysis ● Reporting ● Recovery for business continuity ● Root cause analysis and changes to policies and processes ● You might want to get help to deal with a targeted attack
  • 26. Auditing for GDPR compliant data protection ● Audits for GDPR compliant personal data security and regular security audits overlap partially, but one doesn’t cover the other ● Regular security audits are focused on system security and are based on security principles such as OWASP top 10 ● Data security audit can be significantly lighter and more focused on personal data protection
  • 27. Auditing for GDPR compliant data protection ● Security architecture ● Code inspection for risk structures ● Internal access control ● Maintenance and development practices ● Isolation
  • 28. How can we help?
  • 29. Security audit focusing on data protection related risks for your most vulnerable internet-facing systems The aim is to find problems that, if found by the general public or attackers, may result in sanctions Data security audit 
 for an internet facing service
  • 30. ● Security architecture review ● Accidental data leak inspection ● Automated audit ● Expert review ● Internal access control / isolation inspection ● Security of maintenance and deployment practices review Data security audit 
 for an internet facing service What’s included?
  • 31. ● Complements data protection audit done by Bird & Bird by discovering the unknown ● What’s happening under the hood? ● Is the architecture secure? ● Are there vulnerabilities that may cause a data leak? ● Are the maintenance practices secure? Benefits
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