Vulnerability Analysis of 802.11 Authentications and Encryption Protocols: CVSS Based Approach

International Research Journal of Computer Science (IRJCS) ISSN: 2393-9842
Issue 06, Volume 4 (June 2017) www.irjcs.com
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IRJCS: Impact Factor Value – SJIF: Innospace, Morocco (2016): 4.281
Indexcopernicus: (ICV 2015): 79.58
© 2014- 17, IRJCS- All Rights Reserved Page -16
Vulnerability Analysis of 802.11 Authentications and
Encryption Protocols: CVSS Based Approach
David Gitonga Mwathi*
Department of Computer Science,
Chuka University, Kenya.
dgmwathi@chuka.ac.ke
William Okelo-Odongo
School of Computing and informatics,
University of Nairobi, Kenya.
wokelo@uonbi.ac.ke
Elisha Opiyo
School of Computing and informatics,
University of Nairobi, Kenya.
opiyo@uonbi.ac.ke
Manuscript History
Number: IRJCS/RS/Vol.04/Issue06/JNCS10082
Received: 19, May 2017
Final Correction: 24, May 2017
Final Accepted: 26, May 2017
Published: June 2017
Citation: Mwathi, D. G.; Okelo-Odongo, W. & Opiyo, E. (2017), 'Vulnerability Analysis of 802.11 Authentications and
Encryption Protocols: CVSS Based Approach', IRJCS:: International Research Journal of Computer Science Volume
IV (Issue VI), 16-23.
Editor: Dr.A.Arul L.S, Chief Editor, IRJCS, AM Publications, India
Copyright: ©2017 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, Which
Permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited
Abstract - This paper analysis vulnerability of known attacks on WLAN cipher suite, authentication mechanisms and
credentials using common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS).
Keywords - WLAN vulnerabilities, Cipher suite, CVSS analysis, attack tree analysis, authentication mechanism
I. INTRODUCTION
Public wireless local area networks (PWLANs) are today available in many places; University campuses, coffee
shops, hotels, airports, homes, fast-food restaurants and municipalities/cities [13], [14]. One of the main reasons
for their popularity is provision for the support of a normal local area network while allowing movement of client
devices without the added cost and complexity of cabling within the coverage area of that Wireless LAN. However,
WLANs presents a set of unique risks [5]. The access point broadcasts its service set identifier (SSID), signal level,
MAC address, security features and location to devices within its signal coverage. This allows client devices
deployed by attackers within the range to detect it and possibly connect to the institutional network. Also WLAN
sniffer tools can be deployed by attackers to capture data frames sent over the air .The captured data is then
imported into encryption crackers for decryption. In situations where the captured frames are unencrypted, one
can directly extract sensitive security data such as email and website passwords since they will be in clear-text. In
addition rogue WLANs masquerading as real access points can establish connections and intercept or inject data
into the real WLAN. Since it is inevitable to deploy WLANs because of the benefits they come with, it is crucial that
critical vulnerabilities are identified so that appropriate countermeasures can be prioritized.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
II. RELATED WORK
A survey carried out by [9] to investigate IEEE 802.11 implementation specific issues that may contribute to poor
WLAN authentication and access control security performance in WLANs implemented in Kenyan Universities
revealed that University WLANs have implemented cipher suite protocols and authentication mechanisms in ways
that expose them to well-known vulnerabilities. Khidir and Ali [6] provide a comparative analysis that reveals
strengths and weaknesses of common EAP methods used for authentication namely; MD5, TLS, TTLS, PEAP, LEAP
and FAST. The analysis is based on the following parameters; authentication attributes deployment difficulties,
dynamic re-keying, requirement for server certificate, requirement for client certificate, tunneled, WPA
compatibility, level of WLAN security and Security risks (attacks) associated with a method. In another study [7]
compares the same authentication methods based on the same parameters with addition of a new parameter
implementation technique.[12] gives a detailed study of some of the commonly used EAP methods; MD5, LEAP,
TLS, TTLS and PEAP. The main advantage of these comparative studies is that we can choose between a technique
which is more reliable for communication and one which is worse. However, in all these studies, none provides
severity levels of the security attacks associated with each method. This information if provided would facilitate
decision making on the choice of the appropriate method based on the underlying circumstances.
Many researchers have established that credentials used during authentication can be pilfered in order to gain
access to a WLAN with dictionary and brute force attacks being the most common techniques [13].Other known
techniques for credential pilfering includes phishing and sniffing. Analysis of various authentication methods
show that the most common authentication credentials include; password, secret key, pre shared key, SSID, MAC
address, one time password, client and server certificates. Each of these credentials has its own vulnerabilities
when used for authentication, most of which are due to misconfigurations. Many hotspots and guest WLANS
operate in open mode allowing any station to connect to that network without any credentials while others have
been configured with default passwords [10]. Some open WLANs may rely on MAC address as credentials
.However, various available open source attack tools e.g. Kismet can sniff MAC addresses of authorized client
devices [8].While these vulnerabilities are known, their severity levels have not been studied.
IEEE 802.11 [2] and [3] defines several cipher suites, authentication and access control methods. Many
researchers have revealed vulnerabilities in these security components. However, their severity levels have also
not been studied. We therefore argue that a lot can be gained by understanding the severity levels of various
attacks targeting various security features.
III. INTRODUCTION TO COMMON VULNERABILITY SCORING SYSTEM (CVSS)
CVSS [4] is an industry open standard designed to convey vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and
priority of response. It solves the problem of multiple, incompatible scoring systems and is easy to understand
and use. CVSS was commissioned by the National infrastructure advisory council (NIAC) tasked in support of the
global vulnerability disclosure framework. It is currently maintained by forum of incidence response and security
teams (FIRST).CVSS is a joint effort involving many groups including CERT/CC, Cisco, DHS/MITRE, eBay, IBM
internet security systems, Microsoft, Qualysis, Symantec. Many other groups have assisted in improving CVSS. The
CVSS Model is designed to provide the end user with an overall composite score representing the severity and risk
of a vulnerability. It is derived from metrics and formulae. CVSS has three main metrics that can be quantitatively
and qualitatively measured; temporal metrics, environmental metrics and base metrics. Temporal metrics contain
characteristics of vulnerability which evolve over the lifetime of vulnerability while environmental metrics
contain those characteristics of vulnerability which are tied to an implementation in a specific environment. Base
metrics on the other hand contain characteristics that are intrinsic to any given vulnerability and do not change
over time or in different environments. In this research, base metrics were adopted for analysis of vulnerabilities
because of their intrinsic and static nature. These metrics include; attack vector (AV), attack complexity (AC),
privileges required (PR), user interaction (UI), scope(S), confidentiality impact(C), integrity impact (I) and
availability impact (A).Attack Vector (AV) reflects the context in which the vulnerability exploitation occurs. The
more remote an attacker can be to the target, the greater the vulnerability score. The rationale is that the number
of potential attackers for a remotely exploitable vulnerability would be much larger than that for an attack
requiring local access. Attack Complexity (AC) describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must
occur in order to place the system in a vulnerable state. This metric excludes any user interaction requirements.
Privileges Required (PR) describes the privileges an attacker requires before successfully exploiting the
vulnerability, and the potential impact they could inflict on a system after exploiting it. User Interaction (UI)
captures the requirement for a user (other than the attacker) to participate in the successful exploit of the target
system. This metric will determine whether or not the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the
attacker, or if a user must participate by taking action.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Metric scope(S) measures whether the authorization scope of the vulnerable component is the same or different
from the authorization scope of the component impacted by the vulnerability. If the vulnerable component is in
the same authorization scope as the component impacted by the vulnerability, then the scope of impact is
unchanged. However if the vulnerable component is in a different authorization scope from the component
impacted by the vulnerability then the scope is changed. Confidentiality Impact (C) measures the impact to
confidentiality of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Increased confidentiality impact increases the
vulnerability score. Integrity Impact (I) measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability.
Increased integrity impact increases the vulnerability score. Lastly, Availability Impact (A) measures the impact to
the availability of the affected Impact Scope resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the
Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g.
information, files) used by a affected Impact Scope, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the affected
Impact Scope, itself, such as networked service (e.g. web, database, email, etc). Since availability refers to the
accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space
all impact the availability of an affected Impact Scope. Increased availability impact increases the vulnerability
score.
IV. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
This involved identification and analyzing the WLAN vulnerabilities exploited by known attacks on cipher suite,
authentication credentials and authentication mechanisms. The attacks directly target the authentication
mechanism itself, authentication credentials or confidentiality and integrity cryptographic algorithms in use
during and after successful authentication and access control. Attack tree methodology was used to model the
attacks which were analyzed using common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS). Articles from peer reviewed
journals, white papers, conference papers, technical reports or part of the standards literature that is emerging in
the area addressing known WLAN authentication and access control attacks on WEP, WPA and WPA2 was used.
Exhaustive search was employed i.e. articles were searched and picked from various sources and databases
matching the inclusion criteria above. The scope of the literature analysis extended from most current to 2001
when the first serious paper on WEP insecurity was presented [1] and the limiting factor was the natural limit to
the effort the author spent on collection. Work that clearly diverged from operational WLAN security was not
taken into account as well as papers that offered highly specific analysis not related to computing and information
security in operational settings. Redundant articles were discarded e.g. where the same or very similar attacks
appear in more than one publication, often by the same (or common subsets of) authors that have gradually
extended a concept. This procedure is summarized as follows;
(a). From the literature sources:
(i) Identify known attacks targeting authentication and access control mechanisms (open, pre-shared key,
MAC address filtering, captive portal, IEEE 802.1x EAP methods),authentication credentials(password,
secret key, pre shared key ,SSID,MAC address, one time password, client and server certificates) and
Cipher suites negotiated during Authentication and Access Control( WEP,TKIP,CCMP)
(ii) Establish the set of tools that can be used to launch each of the attacks and the availability of the tools.
(iii) Establish the security features and configurations that contribute to each of the identified attacks.
(iv) Establish the vulnerabilities in the identified security feature or configuration that lead to realization of
the attack.
(b). Model the attacks on an attack tree using attack tree methodology.
(c). Based on CVSSv3 model base metrics, analyze the severity of the vulnerabilities.
A. Attack Tree
Attack trees are formal methods of modeling attacks by systematically characterizing system security based on
varying attacks [11]. Based on [11], the following procedure was used to create attack trees for this research;
(i) Cipher suite, authentication credentials and authentication mechanism formed the goals with each goal
forming a separate tree.
(ii) All attacks against each goal were identified and added to the respective tree with the vulnerabilities for each
attack forming the tree branch nodes (sub tree)
(iii) This process was repeated for all the three goals.
B. Analysis Based On CVSS Base Metrics
Figure 1shows the online calculator used to compute CVSS scores for all the vulnerabilities

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1: Common vulnerability scoring system version 3.0 calculator (FIRST, 2014)
V. RESULTS
A. Authentication and Access Control Mechanisms Attacks
Table I, II and III shows vulnerability scores of attacks on authentication mechanisms. From the CVSS scores,
captive portal has highly vulnerable attacks when used as an authentication mechanism especially if not SSL
encrypted. Captive portals provide no encryption for wireless users; instead they rely on the MAC and IP address
of the client as a unique identifier which can be spoofed easily. They therefore do not provide protection against
eavesdropping and so are vulnerable to session hijacking (man in the middle attack)/captive portal evil twin. Pre-
shared key authentication exposes a WLAN to access point impersonation attacks as well as Pre-shared key
recovery attacks both with high attack susceptibility. Lack of mutual authentication (access point is not
authenticated to a client station) is a major contributor to access point impersonation/rogue access points. Also
Password recovery, cracker and sniffer tools such as Cain and Abel, which are freely available, can easily recover
weak pre-shared keys. The difficulty of managing security of manually distributed pre-shared keys (PSKs) on
numerous devices makes pre-shared key authentication not suitable for use in large enterprise public WLAN
deployments such as universities. The challenge handshake protocol (CHAP) used in this scheme has
vulnerabilities that are easily broken. This indicates that pre-shared key is a weak authentication mechanism.
Combining pre-shared key and captive portal authentication provides improved security.MAC address filtering
access control mechanism leads to highly vulnerable impersonation attacks and so needs to be avoided. Though
802.1x authentication and access control has many attacks, attack susceptibility of these attacks is on average low.
This makes it stronger than both captive portal and pre-shared key.
TABLE I: CVSS VULNERABILITY SCORES OF ATTACKS ON AUTHENTICATION AND ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISMS
S/N Attack Configuration issue/Vulnerable feature AV AC PR UI S C I A CVSS Score
1 STA
Impersonation
attacks
-Use of MAC address filtering access control
mechanism^
-Lack of Management frame protection^
-MAC address spoofing^
-Open/Null Authentication^
-No Mutual Authentication
A L N N U H H N 8.1 [Very High]
2 Captive Portal
circumvention
(Evil Twin)
-Use of captive portal authentication that is not
SSL encrypted.
A L N N U H H L 8.3 [Very High]
Allowing SSL Self signed certificates from the
captive portal
Lack of Validation of SSL server certificate
Lack of validation of captive portal server name.
A H N N U H H L 7.1 [High]

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
TABLE II: CVSS VULNERABILITY SCORES OF ATTACKS ON AUTHENTICATION AND ACCESS CONTROL
MECHANISMS
TABLE III: CVSS VULNERABILITY SCORES OF ATTACKS ON AUTHENTICATION AND ACCESS CONTROL
MECHANISMS
B. Authentication Credentials Attacks
Various Credentials used to authenticate an identity in a WLAN include; passwords/secret key, SSID, PIN, MAC
address, session key and certificates. These credentials are attributed to attacks as shown in the tables IV and V. The
attacks exploit vulnerabilities that are intrinsic to the credentials or those that are as a result of the way the
authentication credentials are implemented e.g. use of MAC address is easily spoof able, wireless protected setup
(WPS)-PIN is a weak credential, weak passwords, dictionary based passphrases, not regularly changing
authentication server –access point passphrase, use of certificates signed by public CAs, self- signed certificates,
allowing a client to choose the CA, etc. Password recovery, cracker and sniffer tools such as Cain and Abel, which are
freely available, can easily recover weak pre-shared keys. These attacks can be avoided by using strong passwords,
use of certificate signed by an internal trusted CA, not allowing self signed certificates. Implementers should also
avoid use of MAC address only for authentication as well as wireless protected setup (WPS) that uses PIN for
authentication.
3 Pre-shared key
recovery
attacks
Use of Pre-shared key authentication
mechanism^
Weak Pre-shared key ^
Use of challenge handshake authentication
protocol.
A L N N U H L N 7.1 [High]
4 802.1x Identity
theft
-Use of 802.1x with EAP TLS ^
-Capturing user identities from clear text 802.1x
Identity response packets.
A H N N U L N N 3.1 [Low]
5 802.1x
password
guessing
Capturing identity and then repeatedly
attempting 802.1 x authentications to guess the
user’s password.
6 AP
impersonation
attack
Use of Pre-shared key authentication
mechanism ^
Lack of support for mutual
authentication(Access point not authenticate) ^
-SSID Unencrypted
802.1x with EAP based authentication
Weak AP-AS passphrase
Not regularly changing AP-AS passphrase
7 802.1x LEAP
cracking
Use of light weight EAP method. A H N N U H N N 5.3 [Medium]
8 802.1x EAP
downgrade
attack
802.1x AS forced to offer weak type of
authentication using forged EAP-response/Nak
packets
A H N N U N L N 3.1 [Low]
9 802.1x EAP
length attacks
AP or RADIUS server crashes after receiving
EAP-type-specific messages with bad length
fields
A H N N U N N L 3.1 [Low]
10 802.1x EAP of
death
AP crash after receiving malformed 802.1x EAP
identity response
11 802.1x EAP
Start Flood
Flooding an AP with EA Pol –Start messages-AP
CRASHES
12 802.1x EAP
Replay
Lack of a nonce or timestamp ^
an eavesdropper records EAP authentication
process of a legitimate client and replays it to
gain the access to the network
A H N N U N L N 3.1 [Low]
13 802.1x EAP –
failure
Lack of a nonce or timestamp ^
an eavesdropper records a valid 802.1x EAP
exchange and then sends a station a forged EAP
failure message
A H N N U N L L 4.2 [Medium]
14 Brute force
attacks
Use of PIN based WIFI protected setup for
authentication

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
TABLE IV: CVSS VULNERABILITY SCORES FOR AUTHENTICATION CREDENTIALS BASED ATTACKS
TABLE V: CVSS VULNERABILITY SCORES FOR AUTHENTICATION CREDENTIALS BASED ATTACKS
C. Cipher Suite Attacks
This consists of attacks emanating from various cipher suites used in combination with authentication
mechanisms.
Table VI, VII and VIII shows vulnerability scores of attacks on confidentiality and integrity cryptographic
algorithms (cipher suite) negotiated during authentication and access control. From the table, wired equivalent
privacy (WEP) is highly susceptible / vulnerable because of weak confidentiality (RC4) and integrity (CRC-32)
algorithms. The researcher therefore recommends that this cipher suite is not used at all in any implementation
because it will expose the WLAN to highly vulnerable attacks. While TKIP/WPA is also prone to attacks due to
weak encryption algorithm (RC4), the vulnerability susceptibility is moderate because the integrity algorithm is
moderately strong.WPA2/CCMP is strongest cipher suite with known vulnerabilities whose susceptibility is low.
Some of the attack tools include Air Snort for cracking WEP key and Air Crack for attacking WPA.
TABLE VI: CVSS VULNERABILITY SCORES OF ATTACKS ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY PROTOCOLS
S/N Attack Configuration issue/Vulnerable feature AV AC PR UI S C I A CVSS Score
1 EAP Dictionary
Attacks
Use of weak Ms-CHAP-password A L N N U H H N 8.1 [Very High]
2 WPA-PSK
Dictionary/
PSK Cracking
-Weak pre-shared key
- Use of dictionary based passphrases.
A H N N U H H N 6.8 [Medium]
3 Password
based MITM
attack
Use of Password/secret key as
authentication credentials for an EAP
method
4 STA
Impersonation
attacks
Use of MAC address as only authentication
credential.
5 802.1x
password
guessing
-Clear text 802.1x identity
-Weak session key/password
6 Brute force
attacks
-Use of PIN as authentication credential
-Weak pre-shared key
- Use of dictionary based passphrases.
A L N N U H H N 8.1
[Very High]
7 802.1x RADIUS
Cracking
Weak AP-AS passphrase
AS-AP passphrase that is never changed.
A H N N U L L N 4.2
[Medium]
8 RADIUS
certificate
MITM attacks
Self signed certificates. A L N N U H H N 8.1 [Very High]
Certificate signed by a public CA A L N N U H H N 8.1[Very High]
S/N Attack Configuration issue/Vulnerable feature AV AC PR UI S C I A CVSS
Score
1 FMS WEP with Weak encryption algorithm
(RC4^
Use of static encryption key.
2 KoreK WEP with Weak encryption
algorithm(RC4)
3 PTW WEP with Weak encryption
algorithm(RC4)
4 ChopChop WEP with Weak encryption
algorithm(RC4)
5 Bit flipping
attacks
WEP with Weak integrity protection CRC-
32^Weak encryption algorithm(RC4)

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
TABLE VII: CVSS VULNERABILITY SCORES OF ATTACKS ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY PROTOCOLS
TABLE VIII: CVSS VULNERABILITY SCORES OF ATTACKS ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY PROTOCOLS
CONCLUSION
This paper focused on analysis of vulnerabilities on authentication and cipher suite algorithms when implemented
in a Wireless local area network. It brought into light the severity levels of some known attacks on IEEE 802.11
networks. However, we did not suggest any solution to protect the network from the attacks related to these
vulnerabilities. As of yet, there is no complete and fully trusted system or protocol developed to provide security
as intruders’ behaviors are noticeably different from each other . Since technology provides opportunities to find
solutions, introducing new technology may provide some sort of support for the time being. However, as time
goes on hackers will be able to work on the vulnerabilities and develop tools to exploit them. Protecting WLAN
will always pose challenges and therefore implementers need to look at the attack severity levels in this paper and
mitigate the risks by introducing countermeasures that particularly target attacks/vulnerabilities with very high
to medium severity levels.
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_________________________________________________________________________________________________
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