Strategy and Game Theory

I am happy to announce the reprint of my book on Game Theory exercises, Strategy and Game Theory, Practice Exercises with Answers, with Daniel Toro-Gonzalez, Springer-Verlag 2017. Thanks to many of your for letting us know about typos, which are now fixed in this reprint. For your reference, here is more information about our book:

This textbook presents worked-out exercises on game theory with detailed step-by-step explanations (almost 100 exercises!). While most textbooks on game theory focus on theoretical results, this book focuses on providing practical examples in which students can learn to systematically apply theoretical solution concepts to different fields of economics and business. Every chapter initially presents games that are required in most courses at the undergraduate level and gradually advances to more challenging games appropriate for Masters-level courses.

The step-by-step presentation of every exercise seeks to help students understand how to systematically apply solution concepts to different fields of Economics, Business, and Political Science. We provide a short list of the main topics we cover below:

Complete information games:

1. Strictly dominated strategies, strictly dominant strategies, iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS), iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IDWDS), and dominance solvable games.
2. Pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We first present canonical two-players games, such as the Prisoner’s dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Coordination games, and Anticoordination games. We then study games with 3 players, and finally games with N players.
3. Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We also start with two-players, such as the Matching Pennies, and then generalize to games with N players.
4. Strictly Competitive Games and maxmin strategies.
5. Sequential-move games, backward induction, and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPNE).
6. Applications to Industrial Organization (mainly considering simultaneous- or sequential-move games).
7. Repeated games and Correlated equilibrium.

Incomplete information games:

1. Simultaneous-move games and Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE).
2. Auctions (as an application of BNEs).
3. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) and signaling games.
4. Signaling games, first with two types of sender; and then with three types of sender.
5. Cheap-talk games.
6. Equilibrium refinements (Cho and Kreps’ Intuitive Criterion).
7. More advanced signaling games and PBE.

Exercises are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise number. This allows students to pace their studies and instructors to structure their classes accordingly. By providing detailed worked-out examples, this text gives students at various levels the tools they need to apply the tenets of game theory in many fields of business and economics. This text is appropriate for introductory and intermediate courses in game theory, Master-level courses, and as a good complement for first-year PhD courses.

Here is the website of the book at Springer, and here is its website at Amazon. We hope your students can benefit from it!