How to conduct HAZOP workshop...effectively!
HAZOP Study is most powerful technique available with us today to identify hazards and operability issues early at the design phase and thus allows to correct the design well in time and help us in reducing the cost of design change at later stage of the project.
In my 20 years of experience in the Oil & Gas, Petrochemical & Refinery Process Safety engineering, I have observed that HAZOP is being applied in numerous ways across the industry. If HAZOP technique is not applied properly, it may lead to various problems i.e. Team may lose the interest in the middle and there may be chances of omission of critical areas / nodes / deviations; many of the times HAZOP workshop becomes battle ground between designers and PMC / Operators.
Thus a proper HAZOP planning and selection of an experienced HAZOP chairman is key for a successful HAZOP workshop!
Most important part of HAZOP planning is selection of HAZOP Chairman. HAZOP Chairman should be selected based upon following criteria:
- He / She should have good knowledge of applying HAZOP Technique.
- He / She should have relevant experience to demonstrate authority of recommendations made.
- He / She should have good command to lead the team towards meaningful discussion
- Chairman should ensure proper team selection prior to the HAZOP!
It is often observed that Chairman arrives to the HAZOP workshop just the same day as HAZOP and he has no prior knowledge of Process, project and team members! For a successful HAZOP, Chairman should study the project documents prior to the workshop. HAZOP nodes should be discussed with the Process designer to save time of all participants during the workshop.
HAZOP Team selection is also very important criteria for a meaningful HAZOP workshop. It has often observed that many HAZOP workshop are attended by whole team of irrelevant discipline engineers such as Structural / Rotating / HVAC / Electrical / Project Manager, Project director etc. and it ends up in 25-30 participants seated in a large auditorium! This situation is beginning of a failed HAZOP. More the participants means more distraction. Participants move in and out of the room unnecessarily or causes distraction due to mobile phone ringing all the time! Another disadvantage of large crowded team is that relevant people may be sitting at the back and they may not be able to listen others opinion properly and limit their contribution to the HAZOP.
For a successful HAZOP, Chairman should discuss the team formation with the Project team prior to the workshop and limit the team of participants to maximum 8-10 engineers such as Process, Piping, Instrumentation, Project engineer & Operations. All other discipline engineers should be on standby and may participate on call basis.
Chairman should also meet the participants prior to the HAZOP and explain their role in the HAZOP. Chairman should ensure that selected participants are available for the whole session and it must be clarified to the team that it is not allowed to leave the room during the HAZOP. All participants should also nominate their deputies to arrange for the situation, where they may have to leave the workshop due to emergency.
Next step for a successful HAZOP is proper Venue preparation. Venue should be away from outside noise however close enough to call standby team as and when required. The Venue should be sufficient for expected number of participants. Chairs should be comfortable for whole day use. Walls must have facility to post P&IDs. Projector should be ready and lighting should be adjustable to focus on the table to read the documents.
Project team must also ensure availability of drinking water, tea, coffee and scacks arrangements within the meeting room to avoid participants leaving the room frequently.
At the beginning of the HAZOP, Chairman must explain HAZOP procedure and HAZOP rules often called as “Golden Rules”. Golden Rules set the way HAZOP should be conducted consistently in a meaningful way. For example, HAZOP must concentrate on reducing likelihood of cause of the deviation rather than giving recommendation to reduce the consequences i.e. provide Fire & Gas detection or provide active / passive fire protection system etc. It is not the role of the HAZOP team to define loss prevention strategy. HAZOP must assume that Loss prevention engineering is provided as per the codes, standard and local laws. HAZOP team should concentrate on reducing the likelihood of deviation i.e. check if there are positive isolation or not? Some sample Golden Rules of HAZOP are explained below:
- HAZOP does not challenge the design for normal operating conditions. All equipment are assumed to be well designed, manufactured and properly inspected. Plant are well maintained in accordance with the standard.
- No double jeopardy = failure of one single independent element at a time.
- Non process causes are not reviewed in HAZOP (e.g. storm, hurricane, Dropped Objects, external impacts / Sabotage)
- Spectacle blinds are assumed to be in correct position.
- Consequences are reviewed without any safeguards (No human response, No SIF, No mechanical barrier).
- Consequences are described at least up to the initial physical event (leakage, LOC, Offspec, etc.)
- No escalation assessment is reviewed during the HAZOP (No F&G review, Layout, Safety distances etc.
- Manual Valve closure / Opening due to operator error should be considered as credible scenario.
- Control valve can not be used as a shut-down valve.
- Credit can be given to (Alarm & Operator response) only for Normal operating task.
- Credit can not be given to (Alarm & Operator Response) for emergency response.
- Single check valve is adequate unless reverse flow may cause pressure to exceed test pressure.
- Mechanical Protection devices such as PSV / RD are expected to work.
- Operating instruction and operating manuals shall be considered as effective safeguard.
Now a days many operating companies requires a qualitative Risk assessment to be carried out for each hazard. Risk Assessment is a tool in the hand of the operator to prioritize the recommended actions based upon severity of the risk. However, this exercise must be carried out post HAZOP by HSE engineers and should be avoided from the multidiscipline brain storming session during the actual HAZOP workshop. If Risk is identified post HAZOP by Operating company / Contractor’s HSE Engineers, it can avoid distraction of HAZOP team as well as save considerable time of the team members and reduce the cost of HAZOP.
If you fail to prepare then you are preparing for failure. This saying is applicable for HAZOP preparation also. As explained above, HAZOP must be properly planned and executed to make it effective!
Introduction to Author:
Bharat Gupta is a Chemical engineer with wide ranging experience in Process Safety, loss prevention and Risk Assessment for Oil & Gas, refineries, chemical, petrochemical & Pharmaceutical industries. He has started his carrier in 1997 with Alpha Project Services Pvt. Ltd as a trainee engineer in the field of Process Safety and learnt technique of HAZOP, Risk Assessment using software tools such as PHAST & SAFETI
In 2002 Bharat joined Technimont ICB as a Sr. Safety Engineer, where he obtained experience in HSE / Loss prevention engineering for Petrochemical plants with international codes & Standards such as Shell, BP etc.
Bharat has soon migrated to UAE to join WS Atkins & partners overseas as Sr. Process Safety Engineer. In 2007, Bharat has join ESR Technology as Sr. Consultant and delivered various HAZOP / PHSER workshops. In 2010 Bharat joined NPCC as Lead Safety engineer and worked on various offshore and onshore projects.
In beginning of 2016, Bharat has joined Bell Energy as Principal Consultant and delivered several HSEIA studies, Risk Assessment studies and chaired various HAZOP & HAZID workshops. Bharat is also specialized in Layout Safety Review, PHSER workshop, Bow Tie & MOPO workshops.
Contacts
You can reach Bharat on +971-55-4684707 or via email bharatsgupta@gmail.com
Oil & Gas HSE | Sustainability, Safety & Environment Specialist | Incident Investigation & HSE Data SME| Process & Operational Safety Specialist | Production/Construction Safety.
6yGreat article. Thanks for sharing.
Lead Engineer (Mechanical & Process Designs)
7yVery good article! I have been privileged to participate during HAZOP studies for Gas turbine, HRSG and Utility boilers. All the points highlighted in your write up are accurate. Thank you for sharing.
36 Years of Chemical/Petrochemical Industry experience with technical, operational, training and managerial experience.
7yExcellent article . I think the past incidence learning to be consider during Hazop and risk level shouldn't compromise in terms of cost.
Project Manager
7yDheeraj Chaudhary
Specialized in refinery and petrochemical Utilities,power projects and BOP
7yExcellent article with all practical scenarios