Cyber Attack Scenario #3: Remote Access Trojan (RAT) Delivered via Downloaded Virtual Machine

Scenario(s) created to help identify weaknesses in your architecture.

Scenario #3 Overview:

This scenario involves a small defense subcontractor company with around 100 employees that handles non-sensitive information as part of a larger DoD contract. The company, while maintaining basic cybersecurity practices, lacks robust protection against advanced threats. The attack begins when an employee unknowingly downloads a compromised virtual machine (VM) image containing a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), which leads to the attacker gaining remote access to the company’s internal network, exfiltrating files, and escalating privileges to gain control of sensitive systems.

Attack Scenario:

1. Reconnaissance and Initial Compromise:

An attacker (likely a cybercriminal or state-sponsored actor) conducts reconnaissance on the company. Through public information and weak internal defenses, they discover that the company works on a DoD contract that involves network communication and system monitoring. They identify that employees often download open-source tools and utilities to aid in network management, security testing, and performance monitoring.

The attacker decides to target one such tool—a virtual machine (VM) image for monitoring network communications, which is advertised as an open-source solution on a popular online forum. The VM image is regularly used by employees for internal network diagnostics and monitoring tasks, as the company lacks a robust vetting process for external software downloads.

2. Delivery of the RAT via the Compromised VM Image:

The attacker creates a malicious version of the open-source VM image, embedding a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) inside it. The RAT is configured to silently install a backdoor on any system running the VM, allowing the attacker to control the infected machine remotely. The attacker ensures that the RAT is well-concealed within the VM and won’t be detected by antivirus software or other basic security defenses used by the company.

The attacker then distributes the compromised VM by posting a link on a reputable forum or network, where employees of the company may search for tools to help monitor network traffic. The attacker may also send a phishing email containing a link to the compromised tool, making it appear like a legitimate software update for the company's network monitoring system.

3. Employee Downloads the Malicious VM Image:

An employee, tasked with network performance monitoring, comes across the forum post or phishing email offering the VM image. Believing it to be a trusted tool, they download the VM and load it onto their workstation. The employee runs the VM in a virtualized environment, unaware that the RAT has been installed. The RAT silently establishes a connection to the attacker's command-and-control (C2) server, giving the attacker full control over the employee’s virtual machine.

4. Initial Access to Internal Network:

The attacker now has a foothold in the company’s network. From here, they can perform reconnaissance within the company's internal network and map out valuable assets. The RAT provides the attacker with the ability to execute commands, transfer files, and gather information about other devices connected to the internal network.

The attacker begins by:

• Scanning the internal network for shared drives, servers, and other valuable targets.
• Monitoring network traffic to identify sensitive business data that may be valuable.
• Accessing internal systems to see if they can locate and exfiltrate any files related to DoD contracts.

5. Exfiltration of Files:

The attacker identifies a shared folder that contains project files related to a DoD contract. These files contain non-sensitive but important internal documents that the attacker deems useful, including employee names, email addresses, internal communications, and other unclassified information.

Using the RAT, the attacker:

• Downloads these files onto the compromised machine.
• Transfers the data over the established RAT connection to a remote server under the attacker's control.

In addition to files, the attacker may gather system configuration information or credentials cached in the infected system (e.g., network drives or unprotected password databases).

6. Privilege Escalation:

Next, the attacker gains access to the local system running the VM and attempts to escalate privileges to gain higher-level access to the internal network. Since the employee's system has limited access to critical resources, the attacker uses the compromised machine to:

• Harvest credentials: The attacker uses tools within the RAT to capture login credentials stored on the employee’s machine, including usernames and passwords for higher-privileged accounts, or those with access to sensitive internal resources.
• Exploit known vulnerabilities: The attacker runs known exploits or uses tools like Mimikatz to dump password hashes or clear-text credentials from the Windows memory or system registry. They may also exploit misconfigurations within the company’s Active Directory or network access control systems to gain access to higher-privileged accounts.
• Lateral movement: Using harvested credentials or exploitation techniques, the attacker moves laterally within the network, gaining access to additional systems that hold more valuable data or more sensitive systems such as email servers, financial systems, or personnel records.

7. Detection and Response:

At this point, the attacker has access to valuable internal resources and is performing actions within the company's network, though these activities have gone unnoticed because the company relies on basic security measures. The attacker's activities may go undetected for weeks, as there is no active monitoring in place to track internal network communications or suspicious activity across systems.

However, after some time, the attacker’s unusual behavior—such as large data transfers and failed login attempts on higher-privileged accounts—might trigger alerts from some basic security controls in place (e.g., email security systems or file monitoring tools). This triggers an investigation by the company's internal IT security team.

8. Final Exfiltration and Exit:

Before being detected, the attacker performs final data exfiltration, transferring the harvested files, credentials, and other sensitive documents to open file-sharing services. Once on the open file sharing servers, the attackers download the files to their own servers. They erase logs and traces of their activities, making it harder to identify the attack's origin.

In the worst case, the attacker has successfully infiltrated the company’s network, gained access to useful company data, and potentially exfiltrated sensitive project-related materials. This breach could result in significant consequences for the company, including financial losses, loss of DoD contracts, and reputational damage.

This is the scenario. Can your company handle such an attack scenario given your current network security posture?