“The question that haunts me is: What if China has learned the lessons of Cold War I better than we have? I fear that Xi Jinping has not only understood that, at all costs, he must avoid the fate of his Soviet counterparts. He has also, more profoundly, understood that we can be maneuvered into being the Soviets ourselves. And what better way to achieve that than to “quarantine” an island not too far from his coastline and then defy us to send a naval expedition to run the blockade, with the obvious risk of starting World War III? The worst thing about the approaching Taiwan Semiconductor Crisis is that, compared with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the roles will be reversed. Biden or Trump gets to be Khrushchev; XJP gets to be JFK.” https://lnkd.in/eQFtbWGs
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"We have a military that is simultaneously expensive and unequal to the tasks it confronts, as Senator Roger Wicker’s newly published report makes clear. As I read Wicker’s report—and I recommend you do the same—I kept thinking of what successive Soviet leaders said until the bitter end: that the Red Army was the biggest and therefore most lethal military in the world. On paper, it was. But paper was what the Soviet bear turned out to be made of. It could not even win a war in Afghanistan, despite ten years of death and destruction. (Now, why does that sound familiar?) On paper, the U.S. defense budget does indeed exceed those of all the other members of NATO put together. But what does that defense budget actually buy us? As Wicker argues, not nearly enough to contend with the “Coalition Against Democracy” that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have been aggressively building. In Wicker’s words, “America’s military has a lack of modern equipment, a paucity of training and maintenance funding, and a massive infrastructure backlog. . . . it is stretched too thin and outfitted too poorly to meet all the missions assigned to it at a reasonable level of risk." #pentagon #militarwaste #interventionism #war #fiscaldeficits #empire https://lnkd.in/exFmCPKf
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🥂 OUT NOW 🎉 : BERLIN AND THE COLD WAR, where I had the honor of contributing a chapter on the "New Atlanticism" and how West German and US leaders envisioned the future international order after the end of the Cold War in 1989. I thank Ingo Trauschweizer, Seth Givens, and Ohio University Press for this wonderful book in the Baker Series in Peace and Conflict Studies. https://lnkd.in/eVVnrRjv
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'Elite capture' is a low-cost high-reward engagement strategy.
Honored to see my book review of "Embracing Communist China: America's Greatest Strategic Failure" included in this month's issue of U.S. Naval Institute's "Proceedings" magazine. It's a short, sharp read from former Naval Intelligence shipmate, CAPT James Fanell, USN (Ret) and Dr. Brad Thayer. Their thesis: The US national security apparatus - across many years and Presidential administrations - profoundly underestimated the grand strategy and military threat from China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) following the fall of the USSR. The result is now the nation’s number one existential threat to the US losing its dominant position in Asian and global affairs. How did this happen? The authors concentrate on “threat deflation.” Post–Cold War US dominance and post–9/11 diversion of attention to the Middle East, combined with China’s consistent and sustained political warfare and information operations campaigns, which downplayed Beijing’s rising power, resulted in the US national security community failing to recognize and respond to a new, growing threat. This failure was exacerbated by the avarice of many segments of corporate US that invested in China’s rise for their own profit at the expense of American foundational principles such as human rights and democracy. For example, most-favored-nation status and admission to the World Trade Organization for China were supported by the US “Engagement School,” which asserted that through increased contact, China would become wealthy and democratic. The US willingly taught, trained, and equipped its adversary along the way, while turning a blind eye to violations. This “blind engagement” included military-to-military engagements such as inviting the PLA-Navy to participate in RIMPAC 2014 and 2016. There was no measurable goal other than quantity of interactions and no objective net assessment of the outcomes. “Elite capture” is another phrase the authors use to identify accepting endowments at universities, establishing Chinese propaganda offices called Confucius Centers, and underwriting influential think tanks, financiers, and foundations that profited from China’s rise. China used new wealth not only to build its military, but also to support select U.S. broadcast, print, and social media outlets. So, what should the US do? The authors provide several recommendations, ranging from “push back” statecraft that challenges China at the source of its propaganda, to professional education, to ending a policy of “strategic ambiguity” and announcing unambiguous US support for Taiwan, to more controversial measures to complicate and add risk to Beijing’s strategic calculus. This book helps to understand how the US ended up off course - and what can be done to get back on track. It's important reading for American National Security professionals from any background. https://lnkd.in/eA5GqwEJ
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The U.S. Naval Academy dis-invited authoritarian studies professor Ruth Ben-Ghiat from speaking at its Bancroft Lecture. Professor Ben-Ghiat is known for her book "Strongmen," that illustrates parallels and common behaviour by certain autocrats she documents throughout history. One name frequently mentioned is former President Donald Trump (in addition to Mussolini, Hitler, Pinochet, Putin, and Saddam Hussein). “I will be speaking about what happens to militaries under authoritarian rule, touching on Fascist Italy, Pinochet’s Chile and the Russian military during the war on Ukraine,” Ben-Ghiat, a professor of history and Italian studies at New York University, writes in the Sept. 4 post. The resistance to her talk appears to leverage a perception that the topic is inherently "political," as opposed to observational-historic. This episode supports several rhetorical questions that might include: --is it appropriate for Universities to deplatform speakers? If so, when and under what circumstances? --when does evidence-based or observational-based research inference cross the line into "political influence?" If a current political actor's behaviour is included as part of the evidence presented, does that inherently make the evidence biased? --how can scientists present collected evidence, that includes that of a current actor, without being painted as a political actor themselves? https://lnkd.in/g7eTq8Ki
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Honored to see my book review of "Embracing Communist China: America's Greatest Strategic Failure" included in this month's issue of U.S. Naval Institute's "Proceedings" magazine. It's a short, sharp read from former Naval Intelligence shipmate, CAPT James Fanell, USN (Ret) and Dr. Brad Thayer. Their thesis: The US national security apparatus - across many years and Presidential administrations - profoundly underestimated the grand strategy and military threat from China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) following the fall of the USSR. The result is now the nation’s number one existential threat to the US losing its dominant position in Asian and global affairs. How did this happen? The authors concentrate on “threat deflation.” Post–Cold War US dominance and post–9/11 diversion of attention to the Middle East, combined with China’s consistent and sustained political warfare and information operations campaigns, which downplayed Beijing’s rising power, resulted in the US national security community failing to recognize and respond to a new, growing threat. This failure was exacerbated by the avarice of many segments of corporate US that invested in China’s rise for their own profit at the expense of American foundational principles such as human rights and democracy. For example, most-favored-nation status and admission to the World Trade Organization for China were supported by the US “Engagement School,” which asserted that through increased contact, China would become wealthy and democratic. The US willingly taught, trained, and equipped its adversary along the way, while turning a blind eye to violations. This “blind engagement” included military-to-military engagements such as inviting the PLA-Navy to participate in RIMPAC 2014 and 2016. There was no measurable goal other than quantity of interactions and no objective net assessment of the outcomes. “Elite capture” is another phrase the authors use to identify accepting endowments at universities, establishing Chinese propaganda offices called Confucius Centers, and underwriting influential think tanks, financiers, and foundations that profited from China’s rise. China used new wealth not only to build its military, but also to support select U.S. broadcast, print, and social media outlets. So, what should the US do? The authors provide several recommendations, ranging from “push back” statecraft that challenges China at the source of its propaganda, to professional education, to ending a policy of “strategic ambiguity” and announcing unambiguous US support for Taiwan, to more controversial measures to complicate and add risk to Beijing’s strategic calculus. This book helps to understand how the US ended up off course - and what can be done to get back on track. It's important reading for American National Security professionals from any background. https://lnkd.in/eA5GqwEJ
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“One prominent Ukrainian military adviser said the reality was that the Russian arms industry could now churn out 4.5m shells a year, each costing about only $1,000 to manufacture. Meanwhile, in Europe and the US, a total of 1.3m shells were being produced at an average cost of approximately $4,000. That means Nato is 10 times less efficient, and struggling to locate explosives. He said: “We need a central plan like in the first or second world war. If governments have an existential demand, a company should not have the ability to make as much profit as they want. It should be regulated. Industrial warfare requires national institutions and a Nato-level industrial warfare committee, which would regulate prices. “Right now, we have dozens of really high-level, super-important targets each day. And we have only one missile we can use a week, and this is actually insane.”” Don’t worry: rate cuts!
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Our joint article about #NATO's post-Cold war prevalence (co-written by Mane Tsaturyan) was published in "Critique: a worldwide student journal of politics" by Illinois State University. 📑 The paper addresses the main hypotheses explaining #NATO's resilience after the collapse of the Soviet Union by examining two theoretical perspectives: Realism and Liberalism. 💡 Written back in 2022, when we were #Erasmus students at the Universidade do Minho, this article was one of our first academic efforts, and we're excited to finally see it published! ✅ 🔗 Link: https://lnkd.in/dxfri5gB
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This is an excellent article about Russia's war against Ukraine, historical parallels, the dire consequences following a Russian victory, and what NATO and the West need to do to defeat Russia. https://lnkd.in/ddpTtUK9
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The findings of my research project on the relations between the Brazilian military regime and the Soviet Union have been published by MGIMO University Press. The study guide is particularly significant as it represents the first attempt in Russian historiography to deeply explore the phenomenon of cooperation between two ideological antagonists, who found a sensible balance between ideology and pragmatism during the Cold War years. It presents extensive factual material, offering a clear depiction of the multifaceted bilateral ties based on mutual benefit. It is intended for undergraduate and graduate students specializing in the history of Brazil and the foreign policy of Latin American countries, particularly those studying in the fields of 'International Regional Studies' and 'International Relations'. https://lnkd.in/dhwtHVdw
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9moThe challenge Xi faces with the US is the same as they faced in Korea, Amerca’s inability to be predictable keeps it secure.